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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

CASE NO. 20130

RONALD E. FITZGERALD
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SUMMIT COUNTY,

JUDGE DAVID B. DEE

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action asserts the invalidity of a holographic will.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On motion for summary judgment and memoranda the lower court,
without notice or hearing, appointed respondent as personal representative under the intestacy laws and, in denying appellant's
petition for appointment, tacitly ruled that decedent's holographic
wills were invalid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondant seeks confirmation of the order of the lower court.
-1-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts the statement of facts in appellant's
brief with this additional information.

Ronald E 0 Fitzgerald

and Patricia Ann Christine Fernandez Cossey Fitzgerald were married February 29, 1968. The parties separated and filed an
action for divorce November 23, 1971, and a Decree of Divorce was
filed September 13, 1972, Case No. 4237, in the office of the
Summit County Recorder.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The decedent, Ronald E. Fitzgerald, obtained two printed
will forms and proceeded to fill in some of the blank spaces.
The statute in effect at the time the execution of the
purported wills took place invalidated such wills and they are
null and void.
The new probate code which was adopted after the execution
of the wills by Ronald E 0 Fitzgerald, would have permitted such
wills to be probated.
The principal issue to be decided in this matter is whether
the new probate code made void, invalid wills legal and binding
although they were not such at the time of their execution.
The brief of the respondent cites Utah Cases and cases in
other jurisdictions which involve the question prospective v.
retroactive application of statutes pertaining to wills.
-2-

It is clear from the cases that the Uniform Probate Code
should not have retroactive effect upon invalid wills.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I

THE ALLEGED WILLS AT ISSUE HEREIN WERE
VOID UNDER THE STATUTE IN EFFECT AT THE
TIME OF THEIR EXECUTION.
The alleged wills of the testator herein, as they are only
partially in the handwriting of the testator, would not have
been considered valid holographic wills under the law of Utah as
the law existed prior to the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code.
The statute in effect at the time the alleged wills were
executed was Section 74-1-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
and is as follows:
n

An olographic will is one that is entirely
written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of this state and need not be
witnessed. Such wills may be proved
in the same
manner as other private writings.ff
The Utah Supreme Court followed this statute up until the
time of the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code.

See generally,

In re Ray Wolcott Estate, 54 Utah 165 (1919); In re Love's Estate,
75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299 (1930); In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312,
285 P, 285 (1930); In re Alexander Estate, 104 Utah 286 (1943).
The wills in question would not have been admitted to
probate prior to the effective date of the new probate code.
-3-

POINT II
THE VALIDITY OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
AT ISSUE HEREIN MUST BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAW IN EFFECT
IN UTAH AT THE DATE OF
THE WILLS1 EXECUTION.
A question has been raised as to the applicability of Section 75-2-503 (1978 & Supp. 1983) Utah Code Annotated.

That pro-

vision validated a holographic will wherein the "signature and
material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator."

Id.

If this section governs the question of the validity of the will,
the will could be admitted to probate.

However, if this section

is not applicable, and it is the contention of the plaintiff that
it is not, then the will must not be admitted to probate9

There

is ample support, based upon generally recognized principles of
law in Utah and other jurisdictions, for the position that Section
75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, should not be held
to govern the validity of the testator's wills and that, consequent"
the wills in question must be denied probate.
The courts of this state have consistently held that lf[o]rd:
arily legislative enactments are intended to operate prospectively
and not retroactively .ff See McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers1 Retirement Board, 111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725, 726 (1947); In re Ingraham1
Estate, 196 Utah 336, 143 P.2d 340, 341 (1944); see also State vQ
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977).

This rule of prospective

operation must be followed unless there is a clearly expressed legi
lative intent to the contrary.

McCarrey v0 Utah State Teachers1
-4-

Retirement Board, supra, 177 P02d at 726; In £e Ingrahamfs Estate,
supra,

148 P.2d at 341. The court in McCarrey noted the strict-

ness of this rule when it stated:
Ordinarily legislative enactments are
intended to operate prospectively and
not retrospectively. As said in 50 Am.
Jur. 494, Statutes, Section 478: "The
question whether a statute operated retrospectively, or prospectively only, is one of
legislative intent0 In determining such
intent, the courts have evolved a strict
rule of construction against a retrospective
operation, and indulge in the presumption
that the legislature intended statutes, or
amendmendments thereof, enacted by it to operate
prospectively only, and not retroactively.
Indeed, the general rule is that they are to
be so construed, where they are susceptible of
such interpretation and the intention of the
legislature can be satisfied thereby, where
such interpretation does not produce results
which the legislature may be presumed not to
have intended, and where the intention of the
legislature to make the statute retroactive is
not stated in express terms, or clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally, unmis-"~~
takably, and unambigously shown by necessary
implication or terms which permit no other
meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all
question in regardTHereto, and leave "no reasonable doubt thereof. Ordinarily, an intention to"""
give a statute a retroactive operation will not""
be interred. It it is doubtful whether tTTe
statute or amendment was intended to operate
retrospectively, the doubt would be resolved
against such operation. * * * Q "
177 P02d at 726 (emphasis added).
There is no indication of any legislative intent of retroactive application found in Section 7r>-2-503 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

Neither is there any such showing of intent "in
-5-

express terms . . .
annexed to them.11

.or terms which permit no other meaning to be
See McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers1 Retirement

Board, supra, 177 P.2d at 726, found in Section 75-8-101 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which sets forth the effective date
of the statute„
In Section 75-8-101(2)(a) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amendec
it is provided merely that the code applies to wills of testators
dying after the code's effective date0

Section 75-8-101(2)(b) re-

lates to pending actions as of the effective date of the code, a
circumstance not found in the instant case*

Neither of these pro-

visions mandates an interpretation that the code as a whole is to
be applied retroactively to wills executed before its effective
date.
In Section 75-8-101(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, it is provided that n[a]ny rule of construction of presumption provided in this code applies to instruments executed
. . . .before the effective date unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent„"

Although it cannot be stated that the

will expresses an intention that a statute or rule of law other
than the new probate code should apply, it also cannot be stated
that Section 75-2-503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which
recognized the validity of certain types of holographic wills previously declared void, is a "rule of construction of presumption
provided in this code0"

Section 75-8-101(2)(e) Utah Code Annotated.
-6-

The enactment of Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated is a change
in a substantive rule of law.

Therefore, Section 75-8-101(2)(e)

Utah Code Annotated cannot be understood as authorizing the application of Section 72-2-503 Utah Code Annotated to wills executed
before the code's effective date.
Because there is nothing in the code which clearly and unequivocally expresses a legislative intent for the retroactive
operation of the code's provisions, as is required by the
standard adopted in McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement
Board, supra, 177 P.2d at 726 Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, must be given a solely prospective application.
In addition, because Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, effects
a substantive change in the law, the exception to the general rule
of prospective operation of statutes where procedural or remedial
enactments are involved does not apply.

See, e.g., Pilcher v.

State, Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455-56 (Utah
1983).
Although no reported Utah decisions could be located which involve the questions of prospective versus retroactive application
of statutes pertaining to wills, nuraerous other jurisdictions have
considered the question fo whether the law in effect at the date of
the wills' execution, or the date of the testator's death, sould
govern.

A number of these courts have ruled that the law in effect

when the will was executed must be applied.
-7-

For instance, in Barker v. Hinton, 62 W 0 Va. 639, 59 S.E. 614
(1907) the question was the validity of a will in light of an
amendment of the statutory requirements governing attesting witnesses o The court held that

"the law existing at the date of the ex-

ecution of a will disposing of real estate, and not that at the
date of the death of the testator, governs the formalities of the
execution and attestation thereof,"

59 S.E. at 617-18.

In Mitchell v. Kimbrough, 98 Tenn0 535, 41 SUW. 993 (1807),
a married woman's will was challenged on the basis that she lacked
the capacity to execute a will0

The will was executed prior to the

enactment of the statute allowing married women to convey property
by testamentary devise.

The court rejected the argument that the

statute validated her previously executed will, holding that nthe
legality of the execution of a will should be judged by the law
as it was when it was executed, and not as it was at the death of
the testator.11

41 S.W. at 994.

The court's decision in Giddings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 4 A.
711 (1886) also followed the rule that the law at the date of a
will's execution controls when the validity of the will is at issue.
The court held a will invalid because the spouse of the testator
who was a designated legatee was also a witness to the will.

The

court refused to determine the question of the will's validity in
light of a later enacted statute which rendered only the bequest to
the interest witness void,,

4 A. at 713-15.
-8-

Other courts have rendered similar rulings regarding the issue
of whether statutes as to wills should be given retroactive effects
See e.ga, DeMars v. Slama, 91 Nev. 503, 540 P.2d 119, 120 (1975)
(statute which affected right to contract away property previously
disposed of by will was not applicable to contracts entered into
before statute's effective date); Iri £e Berger's Estate, 198 Cal,
103, 243 P. 862, 864-65 (1926) (statute which revoked will of a
woman who later married was not retroactive); Packer v. Packer,
179 Pa0 580, 36 A. 344, 345 (1897) (statute authorizing married
women to execute wills was not retroactive to will enacted previously) ; Burkett v Whittemore, 36 S»C. 428, 15 S.E. 616, 617-19
(1892) (statute authorizing married women to execute will was not
retroactive); Appeal of Lane, 57 Conn. 182, 17 A. 926, 927-28,
(1889) (statute as to attesting witnesses to a will was not retroactive) ; and

Goodsellfs Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Au 557, 558-59,

(1887) (statute providing that wills are revoked where the testator
subsequently marries or has a child does not apply retrospectively).
C O N C L U S I O N
In the present case, this court should follow the principles
set forth in the decisions cited above and it should hold that
Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is not to
be given a retroactive application.

Instead, the law in effect at

the date of the wills' execution must govern.

-9-

That law mandates

that the wills be denied probate and the decision of the lower
court be affirmed,,
Respectfully submitted,

tar old Call l
/Attorney for Respondent
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/ day of January, 1985,

I served 10 copies of this brief to the Utah Supreme Court by personally delivering them and one copy to Lee Ann Walker and
Virginia Curtis Lee was mailed postage prepaid to their address
at 173 Wentworth Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, this
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